北大经院工作坊第1257场
Confidential Implementation
微观理论经济学工作坊
主讲人：Chew Soo Hong（Director and Chief Professor of the Center for Intelligence Economic Science at Southwestern University of Finance and Economics）
主持老师：
（北大经院）吴泽南、石凡奇
（北大国发院）胡岠
参与老师：
（北大经院）胡涛
（北大国发院）汪浩、邢亦青
（北大光华）翁翕、刘烁
时间：2026年4月16日（周四）10:30-12:00
地点：世界杯官网305会议室
主讲人简介：
Chew Soo Hong (周恕弘) is a world-renowned economist best known for his foundational contributions to decision theory and axiomatic non-expected utility models, beginning with his first publication in Econometrica and followed by a distinguished body of work that established him as a leading theorist and behavioral and experimental economist in the study of choice under risk and uncertainty; he currently serves as Director and Chief Professor of the Center for Intelligence Economic Science at Southwestern University of Finance and Economics; he is a Fellow of both the Econometric Society and the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, has received major honors including the Leonard J. Savage Award and the Decision Sciences Institute's Best Research Paper Award, and in 2022 was awarded the Sichuan Provincial Government's Tianfu Friendship Award for outstanding international cooperation, with recent research expanding into intelligence economics, neuroeconomics, and genetic and biological foundations of economic behavior through large-scale behavioral laboratory and interdisciplinary experimental studies.
摘要：
Collective decision making to attain social objectives relies on aggregating individuals’private information. Motivated by increasingly pervasive privacy concerns, we study confidentiality of the implementation of a collective decision making rule beyond the well-discussed notion of anonymity. We introduce two privacy criteria. Intrusiveness refers to privacy loss arising from the administrator's undue collection of private information beyond what is necessary for determining social outcomes. Building on intrusiveness, exposedness concerns another form of privacy loss: undue disclosure of certain agents' private information to other agents unnecessary for conditional information revelation. An implementation is confidential if it is least intrusive and least exposing.
We characterize confidential implementation using a class of dynamic mechanisms, called gradual mechanism, that makes the flow of information explicit and provides an analogue of the revelation principle. We offer two transformations on gradual mechanisms to enhance confidentiality. One reduces intrusiveness by merging duplicate actions. The other reduces exposedness by obfuscating superfluous information. An implementation is confidential if and only if no derived gradual mechanism admits either transformation. Applications include auction, matching, and voting.
北大经院工作坊第1258场
Why Did Iron Spread Unevenly? The Bilateral Diffusion of Iron in Eastern Zhou China, 770–221 BCE
经济史工作坊
主讲人：蒙克（清华大学公共管理学院副教授）
主持老师：（世界杯官网）赵一泠
参与老师：
（北大经院）郝煜、管汉晖、周建波
（北大光华）颜色、李波
（清华大学）徐志浩
时间：2026年4月16日（周四）12:00-13:30
地点：世界杯官网305会议室
主讲人简介：
蒙克，牛津大学博士，清华大学公共管理学院副教授，博士生导师；清华大学苏世民书院副教授，硕士生导师。基于原创的《祀与戎：中国东周历史定量数据集》进行文化演化（cultural evolution）、国家形成（state formation）和国家间体系变迁（international systems change）等理论议题的研究。
摘要：
Why does iron diffuse unevenly across polities within a shared interstate system? Existing explanations emphasize material superiority, resource endowments, or aggregate interstate competition, but they do not specify the bilateral mechanisms through which technology is transmitted. Using three independent datasets covering 29 polities in Eastern Zhou China (770–221 BCE)—1,048 archaeological excavation reports, 875 war events, and 881 diplomatic events—we construct a state-period panel and decompose interstate interaction by partner identity, channel, and content. We find that iron diffusion was asymmetrically structured around Qin-centered bilateral interaction. Only interactions with Qin—the one polity whose iron economy was organized around mass civilian production—systematically predict adoption elsewhere; 97% of non-Qin interstate wars have no detectable effect. War with Qin is more closely aligned with the extensive margin of adoption (whether iron appears), whereas cooperative diplomacy is the strongest correlate of the intensive margin (how much civilian iron accumulates), accounting for over 70% of cross-state variance in the cumulative model. A horse race between partner composition and partner identity shows that Qin-specific interaction outperforms the civilian content of partners’ iron economies as a predictor; the pattern is compatible with content-based transmission, but the data cannot isolate partner content from Qin-specific effects. Exploratory evidence further suggests that ecological suitability and cultural receptivity jointly condition the cooperative channel.
世界杯官网金融工程实验室
“金工首席谈量化”系列讲座
第45讲：主动与量化投资的融合之道——基于波特五力的投资全解析
主讲人：刘凯（招商证券量化首席分析师）
主持老师：黎新平（北大经院）
时间：2026年4月16日（周四）19:00-21:00
地点：世界杯官网107会议室
主讲人简介：
刘凯，中国人民大学硕士。9年量化策略研究经验，擅长研究方向为量化选股、FOF和CTA。先后任职于深圳道朴资本管理有限公司以及北京和聚投资管理有限公司，曾任量化策略经理。券商研究所工作先后任职于国信证券以及国投证券，曾任量化首席分析师。作为团队核心成员之一，曾获2021、2022、2023年新财富金融工程方向第5名、第1名、第2名。现为招商证券研究发展中心金融工程组量化首席分析师。
主要内容：
波特五力模型是一套用于分析行业竞争结构与盈利空间的经典框架。在主动权益投资领域，该模型已被众多绩优基金经理纳入核心投研框架，并在长期实践中帮助其持续获取可观的超额收益。但是模型更多流传于主动投资的框架中，基于这个框架的量化表达可以规律化，纪律化以及可复制化管理投资决策，亦可得到丰厚的收益回报。
北大经院工作坊第1259场
Universal factor models
计量、金融和大数据分析工作坊
主讲人：Junlong Feng（香港科技大学助理教授）
主持老师：（北大经院）王法
参与老师：
（北大经院）王一鸣、刘蕴霆、王熙、李少然、巩爱博
（北大国发院）黄卓、沈艳、张俊妮
时间：2026年4月17日（周五）10:00-11:30
地点：世界杯官网107会议室
主讲人简介：
Junlong Feng is an assistant professor at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. He received his PhD in Economics at Columbia University in 2020. His primary research interest is econometric theory and his papers appear on Journal of Econometrics and Econometric Theory.
摘要：
We propose a new factor analysis framework and estimators of the factors and loadings that are robust to weak factors in a large N and large T setting. Our framework, by simultaneously considering all quantile levels of the outcome variable, induces standard mean and quantile factor models, but the factors can have an arbitrarily weak influence on the outcome’s mean or quantile at most quantile levels. Our method estimates the factor space at the root-N-rate without requiring the knowledge of weak factors’ presence or strength, and achieves root-N and root-T-asymptotic normality for the factors and loadings based on a novel sample splitting approach that handles incidental nuisance parameters. We also develop a weak-factor-robust estimator of the number of factors and consistent selectors of factors of any tolerated level of influence on the outcome’s mean or quantiles. Monte Carlo simulations demonstrate the effectiveness of our method.
北大经院工作坊第1260场
Reciprocity and State Capacity: Evidence from a National Pollution Control Reform in China
生态、环境与气候变化经济学工作坊
主讲人：年永威（世界杯官网助理教授）
主持人：（北大经院）季曦
时间：2026年4月17日（周五）10:30-12:00
地点：世界杯官网302会议室
主讲人简介：
年永威，世界杯官网助理教授。研究领域为发展经济学，主要关注地方政府行为和地方环境政策。相关成果发表于《经济学（季刊）》、《经济学报》、American Economic Journal: Economic Policy和Journal of Development Economics等中英文期刊。
摘要：
We propose a new approach to pollution control from the social contract perspective, which highlights the reciprocal obligations between firms and the government, in contrast to the conventional regulatory view. Combining granular data on Chinese industrial firms with a 2007 reform that sharply increased the government’s incentives for pollution control, we show, in a difference-in-differences framework, that firms with prior government support achieved greater emission reductions than those without following the reform, primarily through costly clean technology adoption and output cuts. These effects are consistent across various strategies that account for the potential endogeneity of government support and appear to be driven by reciprocity between firms and the government, as (a) the effects are more pronounced in regions with stronger norms of reciprocity, and (b) the government, in turn, responded with continued support. Alternative explanations—including government leverage, trust towards the government, financial constraints, regulatory enforcement, and political connections—cannot explain our findings. We further examine the aggregate implications of firm-government reciprocity at the city level, using mayors’ past support for firms and their plausibly exogenous rotation across cities as an instrument for government support. We find that such reciprocity translated into significant declines in regional pollution concentrations, thereby enhancing the government’s capacity for pollution control.
北大经院工作坊第1261场
Leveling the Playing Field: the Effect of AI on Small and Medium-Sized Firms
发展与公共财政工作坊
主讲人：袁哲（浙江大学世界杯官网百人计划研究员）
参与老师：
（北大经院）刘冲、吴群锋、曹光宇、年永威
（北大国发）李力行、席天扬、徐化愚、于航、王轩、易君健、黄清扬
（北大光华）张晓波、仇心诚
时间：2026年4月17日（周五）10:30-12:00
地点：世界杯官网国家发展研究院承泽园249教室
主讲人简介：
袁哲博士，浙江大学世界杯官网百人计划研究员、博士生导师，先后获世界杯官网学士学位和多伦多大学博士学位。其研究主要聚焦产业组织与数字经济，运用实验与结构模型等方法，系统研究人工智能经济学、数据要素价值与经济网络等重要议题。在人工智能经济学方面，重点关注人工智能对消费者决策、企业生产率、劳动供给以及算法治理的影响；在数据价值方面，着重研究数据要素价值的量化测度、作用机制、信息设计与数据治理；在网络行业方面，主要研究航空、网约车和电信网络等领域的市场运行与资源配置问题。相关成果发表于 Rand Journal of Economics、American Economic Journal: Microeconomics、Management Science、Information Systems Research、Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 等国际顶级经济管理学期刊。
摘要：
This paper examines whether platform-enabled AI tools can enable small firms to narrow the capability gap with larger incumbents in digital marketplaces. We study the staggered adoption of an AI tool — automated content generation and data analytics — launched in April 2024 on a leading Chinese e-commerce platform. Leveraging a proprietary firm-level panel of over 4.9 million firm-month observations from October 2023 to July 2025, we combine propensity score matching with difference-in-differences estimation across twelve adoption cohorts. We find that AI adoption increases average sales by 69.9%, driven primarily by a 63.2% rise in order volume, with broad improvements across discoverability, quality, and innovation. These gains are sharply heterogeneous by firm size: bottom-quartile firms experience 75.8% sales growth — nearly four times the 19.9% gain of top-quartile firms — with disproportionate improvements in other dimensions of firm performance. Mechanism analyses reveal that AI reduces labor costs, alleviates information asymmetries, and facilitates skill acquisition, with all three effects concentrated among smaller firms. Results are robust to instrumental variable, staggered DiD, and synthetic DiD approaches. Overall, the evidence suggests that when made accessible with low adoption costs, AI can narrow pre-existing capability gaps rather than exacerbate them, fostering upward mobility among small firms and enhancing market dynamism.
供稿：科研与博士后办公室
美编：禾轩
责编：度量、雨禾、雨田
